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Abstract
The Minnesota Department of Transportation (MnDOT) has added MnPASS High Occu-
pancy Toll (HOT) lanes on two freeway corridors in the Twin Cities. While not the first
HOT lanes in the country, the MnPASS lanes are the first implementation of road pricing
in Minnesota and possess a dynamic pricing schedule. Tolls charged to single occupancy
vehicles (SOVs) are adjusted every three minutes according to HOT lane vehicle density.
Given the infancy of systems like MnPASS, questions remain about drivers responses to
toll prices. Three field experiments were conducted on the corridors during which prices
were changed. Data from the field experiments as well as two years of toll and traffic data
were analyzed to measure driver responses to pricing changes. Driver elasticity to price
was positive with magnitudes less than 1.0. This positive relationship between price and
demand is in contrast with the previously held belief that raising the price would discourage
demand. In addition, drivers consistently paid between approximately $60-120 per hour of
travel time savings, much higher than MnDOT’s value of time (VOT) of $15/hr. Reasons
for this include the value drivers place on reliability, a misperception about the actual time
savings and that MnPASS users have a greater VOT than the average driver. Four alter-
native pricing strategies are then proposed. These pricing strategies were tested using a
HOT lane choice model based on previous research. The share of transponder owning SOVs
using the MnPASS lane was measured against price producing positive elasticity values at
lower prices and negative elasticity values at higher prices. MnPASS lane usage rises with
price at lower tolls due to the increased time savings benefit but is eventually outweighed
by the price, causing the lane share to decrease at higher tolls.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Since 1992, the Minneapolis - St. Paul metropolitan area has used managed lanes to increase
person throughput during peak periods (Doan, 2013). With limited capacity and excess
demand, speeds slow during the morning and afternoon commute. I-394 stretches from
the western suburbs into downtown Minneapolis. The freeway originally contained high
occupancy vehicle (HOV) lanes, including a two lane, barrier separated, reversible section.
This section runs along approximately 1/3rd of the freeway’s length. The remaining section
contained one concurrent, double white line separated HOV lane running in each direction.
In 2005, the Minnesota Department of Transportation (MnDOT) converted the HOV lanes
on I-394 to high occupancy toll (HOT) lanes.
While the HOV lanes benefited carpools, motorcycles, and buses, single occupant ve-
hicle (SOVs) drivers complained of their underutilization. In order to maintain the car-
pooling/transit incentive while utilizing the lanes to a greater extent, MnDOT explored the
concept of HOT lanes. HOT lanes are a form of congestion pricing. They are tolled lanes
(on otherwise untolled roads) which give a free or discounted trip for HOV users, and are
thus optional. Other forms of congestion pricing may charge for use of all lanes.
Before the MnPASS lanes, no forms of road pricing had been adopted in Minnesota.
Because the general purpose lanes remain free of charge, HOT lanes presented a more
politically feasible option than other forms of congestion pricing (Fielding and Klein, 1993).
The MnPASS lanes would remain free of charge for carpools, buses, and motorcycles and
the toll would regulate SOV use (Turnbull, 2008). The toll helps ensure a high level of
service (LOS) and provides some additional revenue (Konishi and Mun, 2010). Level of
service is an A-F scale defined in the Highway Capacity Manual with A representing free
flow speeds and F breakdown (Transportation Research Board, 2000).
Support for HOT lanes appears across various income levels, household sizes and ed-
ucational levels (Munnich and Buckeye, 2007; Burris et al., 2007). In addition, support
1
2tends to increase after implementation and is higher among areas with existing tolled roads
(Finkleman et al., 2011; Burris et al., 2007). Safirova et al. (2003) believes that while HOT
lanes benefit all income groups, they more greatly benefit the wealthy. Mowday (2006), on
the other hand, believes HOT lanes are equitable due to users paying directly for use of the
road. Finkleman et al. (2011) remarks that older, non-retired individuals and those new
to their location support tolling more than others. While retired individuals may object to
tolling due to their fixed income, Burris and Pendyala (2002) suggest that the retired and
others on flexible schedules can more easily adjust their trips to avoid tolls and congestion.
While the idea seems to appease all sides of the debate, concerns arose, especially by
those already using the HOV lanes (Burris et al., 2007). Transit proponents feared that
the LOS in the HOT lanes would degrade (Turnbull, 2008). Turnbull (2008) and Burris
and Xu (2006) analyzed the potential mode shift from transit to SOV. All cases resulted in
either a statistically insignificant change or small enough change not to affect LOS. Munnich
and Buckeye (2007) observed a similar conservation of LOS on I-394 in Minneapolis after
the conversion from HOV to HOT. In an analysis of the HOT lane conversion on I-85 in
Atlanta, Kall et al. (2009) determined no statistically significant change in emissions levels
due to mode shifting from the conversion. Dahlgren (2002) adds that lower emissions may
result from HOT lanes due to reduced GP congestion.
In order to guarantee that HOVs could continue to use the HOT lanes at a high LOS,
MnDOT adopted a dynamic pricing system. Similar systems had been adopted on several
HOT lanes around the country, but none with such frequent price changes. The toll price
for SOVs is displayed at various plazas along the corridor. Loop detectors monitor the
density in the HOT lanes. As density in the HOT lanes rises, so too does the toll price. As
congestion clears and density decreases, the price lowers again. Dynamic pricing, in theory,
allows MnDOT to control the amount of SOV traffic in the HOT lanes and maintain a high
LOS. This thesis reexamines that assumption.
Although I-394 was not the first HOT lane corridor in the country, few before had imple-
mented a dynamic pricing scheme with such frequent pricing changes (every three minutes).
The MnPASS Express Lanes, as the HOT lanes are called in Minnesota, have been running
since 2005. In 2009, MnDOT added MnPASS lanes to the I-35W corridor. One MnPASS
3lane runs in each direction, separated by a double white line. In the southbound direction,
the lane begins at 42nd Street South in Minneapolis and continues to the southern suburb
of Lakeville. The northbound lane begins in Lakeville and continues to 38th Street South in
Minneapolis where it becomes a priced dynamic shoulder lane (PDSL). The shoulder lane
continues to downtown Minneapolis (MnDOT, 2013a). The success of the lanes has created
interest for expansion to other metro freeways (Cambridge Systematics, 2010).
Given that dynamically priced HOT lanes is a relatively new concept, questions exist
how optimal the current MnPASS pricing algorithm is at maximizing throughput while
maintaining free flow speeds. The current algorithm operates by raising prices as the
density in the MnPASS lanes rises. The assumption is that higher prices will dissuade
usage and lower prices will entice users. Through this fluctuation in price, demand in the
MnPASS lanes can be regulated and breakdown prevented.
This thesis first analyzes driving behavior, specifically looking at how much drivers
pay for time savings and and their elasticity to change in price. By better understanding
drivers responses to price, changes can be made to the pricing algorithm to better control
the amount of demand. Current assumptions about drivers responses to pricing changes
will be examined. Driving behavior is analyzed by looking at changes to price in demand
using various data sources and methods.
Alternative pricing strategies are proposed which would allow MnPASS operators to
more simply determine toll priced based on traffic density. The pricing strategies use simple
functions to determine toll based on density. Unlike the current pricing algorithm, there is
no need for various data tables. The current density (HOT and/or GP) directly determines
the price. Three of the strategies account for GP density and tie the toll more closely to
the time savings value provided by the MnPASS lanes. Each pricing strategy is presented
including graphs comparing prices to the current algorithm and the respective HOT and
GP densities.
These pricing strategies are then tested using a lane choice model based on previous
research. The lane choice model is first calibrated. The calibrated lane choice model is then
used to test each of the pricing strategies. Multiple iterations are run in which the share
of transponder owning SOVs using the MnPASS lane is measured. The pricing coefficients
4are altered between each iteration. Finally, the HOT lane share is graphed versus price for
each pricing strategy and demand elasticity to price is determined.
Data sources for these analyses include loop detectors, logs of price and density mea-
surements from MnPASS as well as logs of individual MnPASS subscribers transponder
data. The methods and results as well as their implications are discussed in the following
sections.
The following table defines variables used throughout this thesis.
Table 1.1: Variable Definitions
Variable Definition Introduced
B The baseline period for the field experiment Chapter 4
C The control period for the field experiment Chapter 4
D A measure of demand for the MnPASS lane (density, SMnPASS) Chapter 3
E The field experiment period Chapter 4
HOTshare The percentage of transponder owning SOVs which use the MnPASS lane Chapter 6
K Traffic density in vehicles/mile/lane Chapter 2
L SOV use of the MnPASS lane Chapter 7
P Toll price in USD Chapter 2
Q Traffic flow Chapter 3
R Radio transponder ownership Chapter 7
SMnPASS The percentage of freeway throughput using the MnPASS lane Chapter 3
t Time of MnPASS algorithm pricing changes Chapter 3
T The expected travel time along the corridor for the respective lane type Chapter 7
∆T The difference in travel time between the HOT and GP lanes in minutes Chapter 7
V The expected travel time variability for the respective lane type Chapter 7
∆V The difference in travel time variance in minutes Chapter 7
Chapter 2
Background
2.0.1 Frequency of Use
Each paying MnPASS user has a transponder, which communicates with detectors along
the corridor to determine a user’s entry and exit point and charge accordingly. The time
of entry, amount charged and entry and exit plazas is recorded for each trip. This log was
used to determine how frequently MnPASS subscribers pay to use the lanes. Subscribers
are charged $1.50 per month for leasing the transponder. The frequency of use analysis
includes all subscribers throughout 2011 and 2012 and averages their use over the two-year
period. It is not limited to those subscribers whose lease remains active over the entire
two-year period.
The frequency of use analysis focused on personal and business accounts separately. No
data were provided by MnPASS to specifically determine which accounts are business and
which are personal. Therefore, the assumption was made that accounts with more than two
transponders were business accounts, while those with one or two were personal. There are
likely some personal accounts with more than two transponders and some business accounts
with fewer than three, however two transponders was selected as a reasonable limit for most
personal accounts. Personal and business accounts were separated based on the assumption
that drivers with business accounts are less sensitive to price, because they are not charged
the toll personally. This is true regardless of trip purpose. Individual accounts make up
around 76 % of all MnPASS accounts. Unless explicitly stated, analysis throughout this
thesis includes both business and personal accounts due to the inability to distinguish the
two using loop detector data.
Figure 2.1 below depicts the number of MnPASS subscribers in 2011 and 2012 and the
breakdown based on frequency of use during the morning peak period (weekdays/year). The
data are divided into accounts which had two or fewer transponders (individual accounts)
and accounts with at least 3 transponders (business accounts). The data sets were fitted
5
6with exponential decay functions. The functions, their equation and respective r2 values
are displayed.
The results indicate that most users do not use the MnPASS lanes every weekday for
their commute, but rather select various days to use the lanes. The number for trips among
different frequencies of users is fairly constant for individual users. For business accounts,
the number of trips declines steadily with frequency.
Figure 2.1: Frequency of Use - 2011 & 2012
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Figure 2.2: Where y represents the number of MnPASS users and x the number of weekdays per year a
user paid to use the lanes
Data taken over all weekdays in 2011 and 2012
Trips include any paid use of the MnPASS lanes
2.0.2 Current Operation
Figures 2.3 and 2.4 display the MnPASS entry and exit points along I-394 and I-35W.
Outside of these points, drivers are not supposed to enter or exit the MnPASS lanes. Double
white lines separate the lanes except during the entry and exit points, during which the
lines are dashed. Plazas 1003, 3005, and 3012, which are referenced later in the analysis,
are labled in the figures. The hours of operations are summarized in Table 2.1 below.
7Figure 2.3: MnPASS Entry and Exit Points on I-394
MnPASS (http://www.mnpass.org/)
Figure 2.4: MnPASS Entry and Exit Points on I-35W
MnPASS (http://www.mnpass.org/)
8Table 2.1: Hours of Operation
Corridor Direction Section Start Time End Time
I-394 EB I-494 to Hwy 100 6:00 10:00
I-394 EB Hwy 100 to Downtown Minneapolis 6:00 13:00
I-394 WB Hwy 100 to I-494 14:00 19:00
I-394 WB Downtown Minneapolis to Hwy 100 14:00 5:00
I-35W NB Crystal Lake Road to Hwy 62 6:00 10:00
I-35W NB Hwy 62 to Downtown Minneapolis 6:00, 15:00 10:00, 19:00
I-35W SB 42nd St to I-494 6:00, 15:00 10:00, 19:00
I-35W SB I-494 to Hwy 13 15:00 19:00
Prices during operation times range from a minimum of $0.25 to a maximum $8.00.
I-394 and I-35W are each divided into multiple sections with prices posted for use of each
segment. The maximum price applies to use of each section individually, as well as use of
all sections.
Prices are adjusted every three minutes based density levels measured in the MnPASS
lanes only. Traffic levels in the GP lanes does not influence price. Loop detector counts are
taken every 30 seconds. These counts are used to calculate the density in the MnPASS lanes
at various plazas along the corridor. Each plaza consists of a multiple parallel detectors, one
for each lane. Density measurements are averaged over the last 6 minute period in order to
smooth out fluctuations. Drivers are charged based on the maximum density downstream
of their entrance point. Densities upstream do not influence the paid price. Price is dictated
by the magnitude of density as well as the change in density over the previous 6 minutes.
A rise in density creates an increase in price. Table 6.3 displays the pricing plan, which
regulates the price based on density level. Minimums and maximums for a given LOS must
be maintained. Table 6.4 indicates the changes in price caused by a change in density.
9Table 2.2: Pricing Plan for Normal Operation of MnPASS Lanes (both I-35W and I-394)
Level of Service Min K Max K Min Rate ($) Default Rate ($) Max Rate ($)
A 0 11 0.25 0.25 0.50
B 12 18 0.50 0.50 1.50
C 19 31 1.50 1.50 2.50
D 32 42 2.50 3.00 3.50
E 43 49 3.50 5.00 5.00
F 50 50 5.00 8.00 8.00
Density in veh/mi/ln; Prices in $
Table 2.3: Price Changes Based on Changes in Density - Used for all pricing plans
Density ∆ 1 ∆ 2 ∆ 3 ∆ 4 ∆ 5 ∆ 6
0-18 $0.25 $0.25 $0.25 $0.25 $0.25 $0.25
19+ $0.25 $0.50 $0.75 $1.00 $1.25 $1.50
Density in veh/mi/ln
Price increases between $0.25 and $1.50 with a change in density between 1 and 6 veh/mi/ln
2.0.3 Average Tolls and Time Savings
The average payment for time savings on the MnPASS lanes was calculated for I-394 and I-
35W for both the morning and afternoon peak periods. Two years of toll and loop detector
data (2011 & 2012) were gathered in order to compute the average time savings for using
the MnPASS lanes and the average paid toll. Pricing data came directly from logs provided
by the MnPASS operators. Prices were provided for each plaza along the corridor, every
3 minutes. These represent posted prices and not individually paid prices. Average toll
prices were computed by weighing the posted prices by the number of users experiencing
a given price (reported MnPASS lane density). The average paid toll price also assumes
use of the entire MnPASS corridor. Averages are calculated over the entire paid MnPASS
periods 6:00-10:00 & 14:00-19:00 for I-394 and 6:00-10:00 & 15:00-19:00 for I-35W.
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Time savings was calculated using loop detector data from the MnPASS and GP lanes.
Commute times for the GP and MnPASS lanes were calculated assuming use of the entire
corridor. The time savings assumes drivers are entering downtown Minneapolis during
the morning commute. It does not account for time savings as a result of avoiding the
queue to I-94 eastbound or other similar circumstances. The MnPASS corridor stretches
approximately 12.4 miles (19.96 km) on I-394 and 16 miles (25.75 km) on I-35W. Calibrated
field lengths were used for the detectors, which provide occupancy data every 30 seconds
(MnDOT, 2013). From the occupancy data, average speeds were calculated for each series
of detectors along the corridor. Speeds were averaged over a three-minute time period,
corresponding to the frequency of pricing changes.
In order to reduce extraneous speeds caused by varying vehicle sizes or detector reading
inaccuracies, two filtering methods were applied. First, speeds exceeding 75 mph (120.7
km · h−1) were eliminated. Speed limits along the MnPASS corridors are most commonly
55 or 60 mph (88.5 or 96.6 km · h−1), with a stretch of I-35W at 65 mph (104.6 km · h−1)
near the southern edge of the system. Second, interval speeds calculated from a single
vehicle were eliminated to reduce the likelihood of inaccurate speed measurements (caused
by very large or very small vehicles). A low speed threshold was not applied given that
any non-negative speed was possible. Negative speeds were, however, naturally eliminated
if they existed.
Travel times for the MnPASS and GP lanes were then calculated using the speeds
from each detector series and computing the time required to traverse the entire MnPASS
corridor length. Calculations were carried out for I-394 and I-35W over the entire morning
and afternoon price enforced periods and averaged. Travel time savings were the differences
in commute times between the MnPASS and GP lanes. Like the average prices, time
savings was weighted based on density. Willingness to pay was computed using the weighted
averages of time savings and toll price. Therefore, although data were averaged over the
entire peak period, heavier demand periods were given greater weight. The resulting values
are discussed later.
Table 2.4 displays willingness to pay values from several previous studies. These studies
were selected because they represent similar HOT lane facilities to MnPASS. Burris et al.
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(2012) also includes values for a study on the I-394 MnPASS lanes. The values from this
study represent the average toll prices paid and the respective average time savings. This
differs from willingness to pay, because it is not known what users would be willing to pay.
These values simply represent what users pay and the resulting time savings they gain as
a result.
Average weighted toll prices and time savings during the morning and afternoon peak
periods on I-394 and I-35W are displayed in Table 2.5. Averages are weighted based on the
number of users experiencing the price or time savings. The average toll price for the peak
periods ranges from $1.37 to $2.91. The minimum and maximum tolls are $0.25 and $8.00
respectively. Average time savings for MnPASS users ranges from less than a minute (0.78
min) on I-394 in the afternoon to 2.87 minutes on I-35W in the morning peak. With the
I-394 corridor running 12.4 miles (20 km), MnPASS users experienced 8.1 seconds/mile (5.0
sec/km) average time savings in the morning and 3.8 seconds/mile (2.4 sec/km) in the after-
noon. The MnPASS lanes on I-35W stretch 16 miles (25.7 km), providing 10.8 second/mile
(6.7 second/km) average time savings during the morning commute and 4.8 seconds/mile
(2.98 second/km) in the afternoon. These values allow for better direct comparison of the
time savings between I-394 and I-35W.
The average time savings and toll price values yielded price paid for time savings values
from $60.77 to $124.10 per hour. These values are much higher than typical values of
time (VOT). MnDOT, for example, uses a VOT of $15.60 (MnDOT, 2013b). Burris et al.
(2012) found similarly high values of time on I-394, $73/hr during the morning commute
and $116/hr in the afternoon. Steimetz and Brownstone (2005) discuss wide ranging VOT
values and methods for better handling noisy data.
There are several possible explanations for the high VOT. First, it is expected that users
of HOT lanes have a higher than average VOT, as most travelers do not use the lanes. Fur-
thermore, both individual and business accounts make up the toll paying users. The higher
VOT for businesses raises the overall VOT value. The second reason is distorted driver
perception. As shown by Ghosh (2001) and Yan (2002), drivers have a distorted perception
of reality and likely perceive their time savings to be greater than reality. MnPASS users
probably do not realize how minimal their time savings is on average (Parthasarathi et al.,
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2012). A third factor is that the VOT includes value of reliability (VOR), which represents
the monetary value placed on reduced travel variability (Carrion and Levinson, 2012b).
VOR is difficult to separately quantify, particularly in dynamic pricing experiments where
there is a strong correlation between price and reliability (Brownstone and Small, 2005).
Studies have placed the reliability ratio (VOR/VOT) anywhere between 0.10 and 2.8 (Car-
rion and Levinson, 2012a,b). The MnPASS lanes provide consistent travel time with a very
small likelihood of breakdown. Therefore, some of the VOT is likely due to the increased
reliability provide by the lanes. The MnPASS lanes provide other intangibles which are also
important. The more consistent traffic flow makes driving in the MnPASS lanes safer and
less stressful. Consistent driving speeds yield better gas mileage. Finally, MnPASS users
may take advantage of queue jumps provided by the lanes. Users traveling WB on I-394
and headed south on Hwy 100, can bypass the queue that often forms. Likewise, morning
commuters heading east on I-394 can avoid the queue to enter I-94 eastbound. All of these
are important benefits provided by the lanes which influence the price drivers are willing
to pay for the MnPASS lanes.
Table 2.4: Willingness to Pay from Literature
Reference Willingness to Pay Notes
Brownstone et al. (2003) $30/hr I-15 in San Diego
Burris et al. (2012) $73/hr & $116/hr I-394 Morning & Afternoon
$49/hr & $54/hr I-15 Morning & Afternoon
Devarasetty et al. (2012) $51/hr I-10 (Katy Freeway)
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Table 2.5: Average Toll Prices and Time Savings - 2011 & 2012
Avg. Price (P ) Avg Time Savings (min) Cost/Time Savings ($/hr)
I-394 Morning 2.579 1.673 92.49
I-394 Afternoon 1.369 0.777 105.70
I-35W Morning 2.909 2.872 60.77
I-35W Afternoon 2.533 1.224 124.10
I-394 Morning: 6:00-10:00
I-394 Afternoon: 14:00-19:00
I-35W Morning: 6:00-10:00
I-35WAfternoon: 15:00-19:00
Data taken over all weekdays in 2011 and 2012
2.0.4 Economic Theory - Demand Curve of Toll Roads
Most goods are ordinary goods following the downward sloping demand curve where quan-
tity consumed decreases as price rises as seen in Figure 2.5a (Beggs, 2010).
Some luxury goods, on the other hand, may see an increase in consumption as price
rises (at least for certain prices). Figure 2.5b represents this phenomenon (Beggs, 2010). As
reported in the Miami Herald (2010), drivers on I-95 may increase consumption of the toll
lane as price rises. Drivers see the toll price as a signal of congestion in the untolled lanes
and use of the tolled lanes increases. Therefore, a higher price leads to greater consumption.
Does this mean toll roads have an upward sloping demand curve like a Veblen Good?
Beggs (2010) believes this is, in fact, not the case. In moving up the demand curve
in Figure 2.5b, the assumption is that all other factors are held constant. In the HOT
lane case, this assumption breaks down. The belief of drivers is that the higher price
indicates greater congestion and increased time savings. Therefore, drivers are assessing
their willingness to pay for two different goods with different amounts of time savings. If
time savings is held constant, HOT lanes follow a typical downward sloping demand curve
where quantity decreases with an increase in price. Beggs (2010) suggests that perhaps,
what is really happening as price increases, is that the demand curve is shifting to the
right as seen in Figure 2.5c. Drivers regard the higher priced HOT lane as a different good
(one which provides greater time savings), for which they have a different demand curve.
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Beggs (2010) demonstrates this by noting that if price were held constant, but time savings
increased, then quantity consumed would increase to Q3 on the right shifted demand curve.
Therefore, HOT lanes are likely not Veblen Goods, but rather ordinary goods represented
by different demand curves based on their properties (i.e. time savings).
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Figure 2.5: Demand Curves
(a)
(b)
(c)
(Beggs, 2010)
Part I
Driver Elasticity to Price
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Chapter 3
Aggregate Analysis:
Methods and Results
Understanding the elasticity to price of MnPASS drivers is important to determine an
optimal pricing plan. Very inelastic behavior would mean large price changes would do
very little to change the demand of the MnPASS lanes. This would cause difficulty in
regulating MnPASS demand. Very elastic behavior, on the other hand, would mean large
changes to demand from a small price change. This could lead to erratic changes in demand
from small toll fluctuations.
Equally important to the magnitude of elasticity is the positive or negative relationship
between price and demand. Does MnPASS demand increase or decrease with an increase in
price? The assumption until now how has been that MnPASS lanes are a simple ordinary
good, meaning an increase in price corresponds to a decrease in demand. However, as
discussed by Beggs (2010), this is not always the case for HOT lanes, which may see
increases in demand corresponding to higher prices.
Prices for elasticity calculations came directly from the MnPASS system logs. The
MnPASS logs store posted prices and their corresponding density levels.
Demand was measured using several methods. MnPASS logs store the calculated den-
sities, which determine price. These densities measure HOVs and SOVs in the HOT lane.
Transponder data provides demand at an individual level. Transponder logs only record
paying SOVs. Loop detector data were also used in order to calculate the lane share per-
centage of the MnPASS lanes as well as the vehicle flow for the SOV and HOV usage
section. The MnPASS lane share percentage includes all MnPASS lane users and is not
limited to paying SOVs. It measures the percentage of overall flow using the MnPASS lane.
This helps control against overall fluctuations in traffic due to various externalities since it
accounts for general purpose lane volumes as well as MnPASS. Holidays, poor weather days
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and other known anomalies, however, were excluded from all analyses in order to maintain
more consistent data.
SMnPASS =
QMnPASS
QMnPASS + ΣQGP
(3.1)
Where SMnPASS denotes MnPASS lane share percentage. Q represents flow in the
respective lane type. Flow for the general purpose lanes is the sum of all general purpose
lanes.
Table 3.1 displays driver elasticity to price results from several previous papers. Several
of the studies come from an analysis by Burris (2003). All values are negative and smaller in
magnitude than -1.0. Elasticity results using various methods are displayed and discussed
in the following sections.
Table 3.1: Driver Elasticity to Price from Literature
Reference Elasticity(ε) Notes
Wuestefeld and Regan (1981) -0.03 to -0.31
Oum et al. (1992) -0.09 to -0.52
The Transportation Research Board (1994) -0.10 to -0.40
Hirschman (1995) -0.10 Bridges and tunnels in NYC
The Urban Transportation Monitor (2000) -0.20
Burris and Pendyala (2002) -0.03 to -0.36 Toll bridges in Lee County, FL
Odeck & Brthen (2008) -0.45 & -0.82 Short-run and Long-run
Several studies taken from Burris (2003)
Two years of MnPASS demand and pricing data (2011 and 2012) were gathered to ex-
amine aggregate demand responses to changes in price. Average price and demand (density
and MnPASS lane share %) were plotted every 3 minutes throughout the peak period. The
data is taken from the critical plazas discussed earlier. The prices and densities correspond
to the logs from the MnPASS system. SMnPASS is calculated from loop detector data.
The MnPASS pricing algorithm operates by changing price at time, [t+3:t+6], according
to changes in demand between [t:t+3] (which is also averaged with the change in the previous
3 minutes). Price is responding to demand. In order to measure driver elasticity to price,
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it is necessary to examine changes to demand following changes in price. We are interested
in how demand is responding to changes in price and not the other way around. Elasticity
was, therefore, calculated using the change of price between [t:t+3] minutes, and demand
change between [t+3:t+6].
The elasticity equation:
εt =
Dt+6−Dt+3
D t+3
Pt+3−Pt
Pt
(3.2)
Where D represents demand (density or SMnPASS), P represents price and epsilon the
resulting elasticity.
Two years (2011 & 2012) of price, density and SMnPASS data for the I-394 and I-35W
morning peak periods are plotted in Figure 3.1 and Figure 3.2. Afternoon peak data are
displayed in Figure 3.3 and Figure 3.4. Points are plotted every 3 minutes to correspond
with the price changes. Twelve minute moving averages were used to smooth the data.
The error bars represent one standard deviation in each direction. With the exception of 6
weeks during 2011 and 2012, the pricing plan for the lanes remained constant. Any changes
which occurred were similar to the field experiment described earlier.
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Figure 3.1: I-394 Morning Peak Period Average Price and Density for 2011 and 2012
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Figure 3.2: I-35W Morning Peak Period Average Price and Density for 2011 and 2012
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Figure 3.3: I-394 Afternoon Peak Period Average Price and Density for 2011 and 2012
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Figure 3.4: I-35W Afternoon Peak Period Average Price and Density for 2011 and 2012
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24
Table 3.2: Elasticity Values Using Density and MnPASS Lane Share: 2011 & 2012 Aggre-
gate
Density Elasticity (Density)
Average Average Median Std Dev
I-394 Morning (1003) 23.75 0.8005* 0.6164 0.8387
I-394 Afternoon (2003) 14.05 0.4885* 0.6170 1.018
I-35W Morning (3005) 25.99 0.7448* 0.7331 0.9176
I-35W Morning (3012) 22.64 0.8400* 0.7813 0.3804
I-35W Afternoon (4009) 19.99 0.6320* 0.6117 1.140
I-35W Afternoon (4011) 15.28 0.4880 0.4487 2.332
SMnPASS Elasticity (SMnPASS)
Average Average Median Std Dev
I-394 Morning (1003) 19.82 0.7010* 0.6487 0.7754
I-394 Afternoon (2003) 12.69 0.4638* 0.3818 1.129
I-35W Morning (3005) 22.37 0.1775 0.3911 1.124
I-35W Morning (3012) 13.55 0.6491* 0.5936 0.5044
I-35W Afternoon (4009) 23.75 0.3943* 0.2964 0.7842
I-35W Afternoon (4011) 17.58 0.3392* 0.2264 0.6292
* Significant at 0.05 significance level
Plaza in parentheses
Density in units veh/mi/ln
SMnPASS is percent of overall flow using the MnPASS lane
I-394 Morning: 6:00-10:00
I-394 Afternoon: 14:00-19:00
I-35W Morning: 6:00-10:00
I-35W Afternoon: 15:00-19:00
Data taken over all weekdays in 2011 and 2012
Plaza 1003, 2003 lanes: 1 HOT, 2 GP, 1 Auxilliary
Plaza 3005, 4009 lanes: 1 HOT, 2 GP
Plaza 4011 lanes: 1 HOT, 3 GP
Plaza 3012 lanes: 1 HOT, 4 GP
All statistically significant elasticity values from the aggregate data are positive and
between 0.3392 and 0.8400.
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The MnPASS pricing algorithm operates by changing price to match changes in demand
(raising price with increasing demand). This analysis, however, looks at changes to demand
immediately following pricing changes, in order to examine the response of demand to price.
Overall, the analysis revealed that demand (both density and SMnPASS) typically increased
immediately following a price increase and vice versa.
Chapter 4
Field Experiment Analysis:
Methods and Results
Several field experiments were conducted between October 2012 and January 2013. Drivers
were never made aware of any changes to the pricing plan.
The first field experiment took place on I-394 between October 8, 2012 and November
2, 2012. During this period, prices for all MnPASS lanes on I-394 were altered according to
the revised pricing schedules displayed below. No changes were made to the delta values in
Table 6.4. This same delta table was used for all field experiments. Prices during the first
week were altered by raising the density threshold at each level of service by 2 points (Table
4.3). Prices during the remaining three weeks were altered by raising the density thresholds
by 20% instead of a fixed 2 point increase (Table 4.4). The intent was to lower the average
price to MnPASS users. The altered pricing plans for this field experiment, however, were
based on a pricing plan dating back to 2005 (Table 4.2). The actual pricing plan in place
on I-394 before beginning the field experiment is displayed in Table 6.3. The structure of
the 2005 plan is different. There is an additional C- LOS and the prices for the various LOS
are different than the current pricing plan. The intent was to keep the minimum, maximum
and default pricing values the same. However, because of this different pricing structure,
pricing changes were not consistent across different density levels. Prices at lower densities
were decreased as intended, but prices at higher densities were actually increased. This
difference can be seen in figures discussed in the results section. The error in implementing
this different pricing structure was later discovered and repaired. The second I-394 field
experiment did not experience this same problem.
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Table 4.1: Pricing Plan for Normal Operation of MnPASS Lanes (both I-35W and I-394)
Level of Service Min K Max K Min Rate ($) Default Rate ($) Max Rate ($)
A 0 11 0.25 0.25 0.50
B 12 18 0.50 0.50 1.50
C 19 31 1.50 1.50 2.50
D 32 42 2.50 3.00 3.50
E 43 49 3.50 5.00 5.00
F 50 50 5.00 8.00 8.00
Density in veh/mi/ln; Prices in $
Table 4.2: Original Pricing Plan from 2005 for I-394
Level of Service Min K Max K Min Rate ($) Default Rate ($) Max Rate ($)
A 0 11 0.25 0.25 0.25
B 11 18 0.25 0.25 0.50
C 18 26 0.50 1.50 2.50
C- 26 29 2.50 3.50 4.00
D 29 35 4.00 5.00 6.00
E 35 45 6.00 7.00 8.00
F 45 50 8.00 8.00 8.00
Density in veh/mi/ln; Prices in $
28
Table 4.3: Modified pricing plan for first week of first field experiment on I-394
2012-10-8 to 2012-10-12
Level of Service Min K Max K Min Rate ($) Default Rate ($) Max Rate ($)
A 0 13 0.25 0.25 0.25
B 14 20 0.25 0.25 0.50
C 21 28 0.50 1.50 2.50
C- 29 31 2.50 3.50 4.00
D 32 37 4.00 5.00 6.00
E 38 50 6.00 7.00 8.00
Density in veh/mi/ln; Prices in $
Table 4.4: Modified pricing plan for weeks 2-4 of first field experiment on I-394
2012-10-15 to 2012-11-2
Level of Service Min K Max K Min Rate ($) Default Rate ($) Max Rate ($)
A 0 13 0.25 0.25 0.25
B 14 22 0.25 0.25 0.50
C 23 31 0.50 1.50 2.50
C- 32 35 2.50 3.50 4.00
D 36 42 4.00 5.00 6.00
E 43 50 6.00 7.00 8.00
Density in veh/mi/ln; Prices in $
The second field experiment took place on I-35W between October 29,2012 and Novem-
ber 23, 2012. During this period, prices were altered according to Table 4.3. Again, no
changes were made to the delta values in Table 6.4. By raising the density threshold’s
by 20% at each level of service, price was effectively lowered. The same pricing plan was
used for the entire field experiment. Several days were excluded from the analysis due to
incomplete loop detector data for those dates. The corresponding dates from the baseline
period were also excluded in order to stay consistent.
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Table 4.5: Modified pricing plan for I-35W field experiment
2012-10-29 to 2012-11-23
Level of Service Min K Max K Min Rate ($) Default Rate ($) Max Rate ($)
A 0 13 0.25 0.25 0.50
B 14 22 0.50 0.50 1.50
C 23 37 1.50 1.50 2.50
D 38 50 2.50 3.00 8.00
Density in veh/mi/ln; Prices in $
The third field experiment was conducted on I-394 lasting five weeks. The experiment
consisted of changes to the pricing plan displayed in Table 4.6 and took place in December
7-21, 2012 and January 7-25, 2013. No changes were made to Table 6.4, displayed above.
The holiday season at the end of December and beginning of January was excluded. The
density thresholds at which prices changed were lowered during this experiment, effectively
increasing price. The change was estimated to increase the average price by around 15%.
All other operations of the pricing algorithm were left the same. After the experiment,
prices were reverted to their previous levels.
Table 4.6: Modified pricing plan for second field experiment on I-394
2012-12-10 to 2012-12-21 & 2012-1-7 to 2013-1-25
Level of Service Min K Max K Min Rate ($) Default Rate ($) Max Rate ($)
A 0 9 0.25 0.25 0.50
B 10 15 0.50 0.50 1.50
C 16 25 1.50 1.50 2.50
D 26 34 2.50 3.00 3.50
E 35 39 3.50 5.00 5.00
F 40 50 5.00 8.00 8.00
Density in veh/mi/ln; Prices in $
The field experiments were analyzed by comparing to the same days on year prior. For
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example, if the experiment began on the first Monday in October, that same Monday the
year before was used as the start date. In order to account for changes occurring between
2011 and 2012, a control period was analyzed. The control period usually consists of one
month prior to the field experiment. The changes in the control period between 2011
and 2012 can then be compared to the changes between the baseline period and the field
experiment. The control periods and baseline period all contained the same pricing plan.
This helps determine which changes are caused by the changes to the pricing plan and helps
eliminate other confounds such as fuel prices and employment. MinnesotaGasPrices.com
(2013) reveals, however, that average fuel prices in Minnesota between 2011 and 2012
are within $0.50. Anomalies such as holidays and poor weather days were removed from
analysis. In addition, no changes to express transit service on the corridors were made
during the analysis period (Metropolitain Council, 2013)
Price and demand data from the field experiments were taken from specific plazas along
the corridor. The selected points represent plazas which typically have the maximum density
compared to upstream plazas. Therefore, the density at these critical plazas (as they will be
referred to) is often responsible for the posted prices upstream. Data for I-394 used price
and demand measurements from plaza 1003 in the eastbound direction and plaza 2003
westbound. These plazas include the section of I-394 between Hwy 169 and Louisiana Ave.
The corresponding HOT loop detectors used for the analysis include 5453 for eastbound
and 5460 for westbound. These loop detectors are located within the respective plazas near
Winnetka Ave S.
On I-35W, both plazas 3006 and 3013 in the northbound direction, along with 4009 and
4011 southbound were analyzed. Plaza 3006 includes the area around Black Dog Road and
3013 includes the section of south Minneapolis between 42nd Street and 26th Street. Plazas
4009 and 4011 are located near 98th Street S and Cliff Road respectively. The corresponding
HOT loop detectors used were 525 (106th Street) and 6792 (38th Street) in the northbound
direction and 1000 (98th Street) and 1008 (Black Dog Rd) in the southbound direction. The
general purpose loop detectors used correspond to those listed on the MnDOT All Detector
Report in parallel with the listed HOT detectors. The results discussed come from these
critical points.
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Driver elasticity for the field experiments was calculated by comparing price and demand
to a baseline period. Average price and demand every three minutes throughout the peak
period was calculated as well as the overall weighted average price and density. This was
done for each week of the field experiments as well as same period one year prior. Data cor-
responds to the critical plazas discussed earlier. Prices and densities for this analysis come
from the MnPASS system logs. SMnPASS is calculated from loop detector data. Elasticity
was calculated twice. Once by looking at the changes in price and demand between the
two periods for every three-minute period. Elasticity values were then calculated for each 3
minute period and averaged to yield an average of elasticities. The other method compared
the overall weighted prices and densities for the two periods. This yielded an elasticity of
averages measurement. This same procedure was done for a control period, comparing 2011
and 2012 one month before each field experiment. The control periods utilized the same
pricing plan as the baseline period. The final elasticity for the field experiments was the net
change occurring between the baseline and field experiment, subtracting out any changes
between 2011 and 2012 in the control.
Average of Elasticities
For Field Experiment
εE =
DE,2012,t−DB,2011,t
DB,2011,t
PE,2012,t−PB,2011,t
PB,2011,t
(4.1)
For Control
εC =
DC,2012,t−DC,2011,t
DC,2011,t
PC,2012,t−PC,2011,t
PC,2011,t
(4.2)
Elasticity of Averages
εavg =
DE,2012−DB,2011
DB,2011
− DC,2012−DC,2011
DC,2011
PE,2012−PB,2011
PB,2011
− PC,2012−PC,2011
PC,2011
(4.3)
Where the subscript E denotes the field experiment and the subscript B denotes the
baseline period. The control period is noted by subscript C and each period is marked with
its respective year. D represents demand (density or SMnPASS), P represents price and ε
the resulting elasticity.
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The following figures display changes in price and density for the third field experiment
and its control. Twelve minute moving averages were used to smooth the data. The error
bars represent one standard deviation in each direction.
Figure 4.1 shows the changes in price and density during the morning peak period for
the first field experiment on I-394 occurring between 2012-10-8 to 2012-11-2. As discussed
earlier, the pricing plan during the field experiment followed a different structure than the
baseline leading to a lower price at lower densities and a higher price at higher densities.
The elasticity analysis focuses on the time period between 7:00-9:00. Over this time period,
price during the field experiment experienced an increase on average when compared to the
baseline. Density during the field experiment was higher than the baseline across the entire
morning peak period, including the 7:00-9:00 elasticity analysis period.
Figure 4.2 represents the control period for the first experiment. September 2011 (2011-
9-5 to 2011-10-7) is compared to September 2012 (2012-9-3 to 2012-10-5). This period
represents five weeks leading up to the field experiment. In the shoulder peak, the two
periods follow a fairly similar pattern, but 2012 has a much longer lasting peak. This led
to an overall average price and density increase between 2011 and 2012 in the control.
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Figure 4.1: Price and Density vs. Time - I-394 Field Experiment: 2012-10-8 to 2012-11-2
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Figure 4.2: Price and Density vs. Time - I-394 Control: September 2011 & 2012
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Data in Figure 4.3 show the average price and density levels during the morning peak
period on I-35W for the baseline and field experiment periods. The field experiment took
place between 2012-10-29 to 2012-11-23. The baseline period includes the same days as the
field experiment, but one year prior.
The control period compared October 2011 (2012-10-3 to 2012-10-28) with October 2012
(2012-10-1 to 2012-10-26) to observe changes from one year to the next, shown in Figure
4.4. This period represents four weeks preceding the field experiment. The pricing plans
during the control periods in the same, however, a significant increase demand can be seen
in 2012. This increase in demand led to an increase in prices in October 2012.
During the field experiment, prices were decreased by raising density thresholds. Prices
between the baseline and field experiment are displayed in Figure 9. Increases to price in
the field experiment are due to an increase in demand similar to what can be seen in the
control. Both graphs show a demand increase between the 2011 period and 2012, however,
in Figure 4.3, the price increase between 2011 and 2012 is less dramatic than during the
control in Figure 4.4. Therefore, the changes to the pricing plan had the expected effect of
decreasing price compared to what it would have been if no change was made.
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Figure 4.3: Price and Density vs. Time - I-35W Field Experiment: 2012-10-29 to 2012-11-23
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Figure 4.4: Price and Density vs. Time - I-35W Control: October 2011 & 2012
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Data in Figure 4.5 show the average price and density levels during the morning peak
period on I-394. The field experiment includes 2 weeks in December 2012 (12/7-12/21) and
3 weeks in January 2013 (1/7-1/25). The baseline period includes the same days as the
field experiment, but one year prior. Prices were increased during the field experiment by
lowering density thresholds. Average paid prices throughout the morning peak period were
consistently higher during the 5 week experiment.
Figure 4.6 represents the control period which compares November 2011 (2011-11-18 to
2011-12-9) and November 2012 (2012-11-16 to 2012-12-7). This period represent 3 weeks
preceding the field experiment. The first two weeks in November could not be used in the
control because the pricing plan during these weeks in 2012 was set to match the plan
from 2005 in Table 4.2 instead of the baseline plan in Table 6.3. The resulting changes in
the control were relatively small compared to the changes seen in Figure 11 between the
baseline and field experiment.
Figure 4.5 reveals that the MnPASS lanes saw a consistent increase in density throughout
the peak period during the field experiment. Although less than the price increase, density
at nearly every time segment during the analyzed periods was higher. This led to the
positive elasticity results displayed in Tables 4.8 and 4.9.
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Figure 4.5: Price and Density vs. Time - I-394 Field Experiment: 2012-12-10 to 2012-12-21 & 2013-1-7 to 2013-1-25
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Figure 4.6: Price and Density vs. Time - I-394 Control: November 2011 & 2012
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Table 4.7 displays weighted averages of price and density for the baseline, field ex-
periment and control periods. A net change between the baseline and field experiment,
including changes in the control, are also displayed. The number of lanes corresponding
to the SMnPASS are displayed below the table. Average general purpose lane speeds are
included as another measure of change between the periods. Elasticity was calculated us-
ing both density and SMnPASS as a measure of demand. Table 4.8 shows the elasticity
values calculated from the weighted averages in Table 4.7. Results in Table 4.9 include the
mean, median and standard deviation of elasticity values for every three minutes between
7:00-9:00.
The first field experiment on I-394 resulted in statistically significant changes in price
and density. The control period also resulted in significant changes in price and density
between 2011 and 2012. There was no statistically significant change in the average GP
speed. Overall, there was a net increase in price, density and SMnPASS . Although the
intention was to decrease the price, the varied structure of the pricing plan for this field
experiment led to higher prices and higher densities. The averages were taken between 7:00-
9:00. Over this time period, price was primarily higher during the field experiment than
the baseline. The increase in both price and demand led to positive elasticity of averages
values for the first field experiment. The mean, median and standard deviation of individual
elasticity measurements displayed in 4.9 reveal no statistically significant difference for the
field experiment. There was a high standard deviation of the individual measurements.
There was, however, a statistically significant positive elasticity measured in the control
period between 2011 and 2012.
Values for the I-35W field experiment were separated into measurements from plaza 3005
and plaza 3012. At both plazas, there was a statistically significant increase in price, density
and SMnPASS between 2011 and 2012. There was no statistically significant change in the
average GP speed. The price increases between the baseline and field experiment were less
pronounced due to the “price decrease” caused by increasing the density thresholds. This
led to a net price decrease in price in both plazas. In all cases except SMnPASS on plaza
3012, demand also saw a net decrease when including the control period. This resulted
in nearly all positive elasticity results in Table 4.8. Similarly to the first field experiment,
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high standard deviation values in Table 4.9 resulted in no statistically significant average
elasticity measurements between the baseline and field experiment. The control, however,
saw statstically significant increases between 2011 and 2012. There was no statistically
significant change in the average GP speed.
The third field experiment saw statistically significant increases in price and density
both between the baseline and field experiment. The control period only saw a significant
change in SMnPASS between 2011 and 2012. There was no statistically significant change
in the average GP speed. The net values were all positive, resulting in positive elasticity
values in Table 4.9. The average of individual elasticity measurements were also positive
and statistically significant between the baseline and field experiment for both density
and SMnPASS . Unlike the other field experiments, price, density and SMnPASS for this
experiment saw consistent increases across all time periods and density levels. This can be
seen in Figure 4.5. This consistency led to steady elasticity results and the small standard
deviation values. Another indication of consistency are the similar mean and median values.
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Table 4.7: Weighted Averages of Descriptive Statistics
Baseline Field Experiment % Change Control % Change Net % Change
(1) Plaza 1003
Price 2.024 2.418 19.45* 16.09* 3.353
Density 25.31 27.50 10.54* 9.657* 0.885
SMnPASS 20.76 21.50 3.566 1.627 1.939
GPspeed 91.5 93.8 2.5 0.9 1.6
(2) Plaza 3005
Price 2.010 2.229 10.88* 68.75* -57.87
Density 24.98 30.92 23.79* 37.41* -13.62
SMnPASS 22.36 24.13 7.871* 16.17* -8.301
GPspeed 90.1 89.3 -0.9 2.2 -3.1
Plaza 3012
Price 1.71 1.882 9.717 38.04* -28.33
Density 21.74 25.78 18.61* 22.45* -3.840
SMnPASS 13.36 15.56 16.49* 12.02* 4.471
GPspeed 87.6 85.8 -2.1 -0.8 -1.3
(3) Plaza 1003
Price 2.192 3.044 38.84* -2.569 41.41
Density 26.03 28.07 7.830* -6.381 14.21
SMnPASS 20.9 20.99 2.980 -8.217* 11.20
GPspeed 91.9 88.0 -4.24 -4.04 0.20
* Significant at 0.05 significance level
Time of Day: 7:00-9:00
Density in units veh/mi/ln
Speed in km/h
SMnPASS is percent of overall flow using the MnPASS lane
(1) I394: FE: 2012-10-8 to 2012-11-2, Base: 2011-10-10 to 2011-11-4, Control: September 2011 and 2012
(2) I35W: FE: 2012-10-29 to 2012-11-23, Base: 2011-10-31 to 2011-11-25, Control: October 2011 and 2012
(3) I394: FE 2012-12-10 to 2012-12-21 & 2013-1-7 to 2013-1-25, Base: 2011-12-12 to 2011-12-23 & 2012-
1-9 to 2012-1-27, Control: November 2011 and 2012
Plaza 1003 lanes: 1 HOT, 2 GP, 1 Auxiliary
Plaza 3005 lanes: 1 HOT, 2 GP
Plaza 3012 lanes: 1 HOT, 4 GP
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Table 4.8: Field Experiment Elasticity of Averages
Demand Measure Without Control Net (with control)
(1) Plaza 1003
Density 0.5421 .2641
SMnPASS 0.1829 .5784
(2)
Plaza 3005
Density 2.186 0.2354
SMnPASS 0.7234 0.1435
Plaza 3012
Density 1.915 0.1356
SMnPASS 1.697 -0.1578
(3) Plaza 1003
Density 0.2016 0.3431
SMnPASS 0.0767 0.2704
Time of Day: 7:00-9:00
(1) I394: FE: 2012-10-8 to 2012-11-2, Base: 2011-10-10 to 2011-11-4, Control: September 2011 and 2012
(2) I35W: FE: 2012-10-29 to 2012-11-23, Base: 2011-10-31 to 2011-11-25, Control: October 2011 and
2012
(3) I394: FE 2012-12-10 to 2012-12-21 & 2013-1-7 to 2013-1-25, Base: 2011-12-12 to 2011-12-23 &
2012-1-9 to 2012-1-27, Control: November 2011 and 2012
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Table 4.9: Field Experiment Average of Elasticities
Demand Measure Mean Median Std Dev
(1) Plaza 1003
Density (FE) -0.9719 0.1245 7.385
SMnPASS (FE) -1.192 -0.0719 7.920
Density (Control) 0.5058* 0.4613 0.8900
SMnPASS (Control) 0.1377* 0.0495 0.3914
(2)
Plaza 3005
Density (FE) -2.769 -0.2377 18.05
SMnPASS (FE) -1.624 -0.2695 9.520
Density (Control) 0.6654* 0.5440 0.0236
SMnPASS(Control) 0.3131* 0.2836 0.1752
Plaza 3012
Density (FE) -2.581 0.7562 22.44
SMnPASS (FE) -2.8290 0.4052 22.29
Density (Control) 0.6925* 0.6035 0.2870
SMnPASS (Control) 0.4522* 0.3965 0.3129
(3) Plaza 1003
Density (FE) 0.2110* 0.2307 0.0874
SMnPASS (FE) 0.0981* 0.1011 0.0755
Density (Control) 1.016 1.159 3.148
SMnPASS (Control) 0.8144 0.9299 2.447
* Significant at 0.05 significance level
Time of Day: 7:00-9:00
(1) I394: FE: 2012-10-8 to 2012-11-2, Base: 2011-10-10 to 2011-11-4, Control: September 2011 and 2012
(2) I35W: FE: 2012-10-29 to 2012-11-23, Base: 2011-10-31 to 2011-11-25, Control: October 2011 and
2012
(3) I394: FE 2012-12-10 to 2012-12-21 & 2013-1-7 to 2013-1-25, Base: 2011-12-12 to 2011-12-23 &
2012-1-9 to 2012-1-27, Control: November 2011 and 2012
Loop detector data were used to determine the total number of MnPASS lanes users
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(HOV + SOV) along the two corridors. Counts were gathered for the critical plaza(s) on
each corridor using loop detector 5453 for eastbound I-394 and 5460 for westbound. On I-
35W, loop detectors 525 and 6792 in the northbound direction were used and 1000 and 1008
in the southbound direction. The transponder logs record the starting and ending plaza for
paying SOVs, along with their starting time and paid toll. The assumption was made that
drivers do not exit the MnPASS lane between their starting and ending plaza. Therefore,
a paying SOV is counted at each plaza between their starting and ending plaza. If the
critical plaza lies between the starting and ending plaza, the vehicle is counted as a paying
SOV. Cross-referencing these two data sources, independent counts for SOV and HOV can
be determined. SOV in this case excludes business account which are those accounts with
more than two transponders.
Vehicle counts from the field experiment as well as the baseline period were gathered.
The tolls paid by SOVs were used to find the average price paid for each period. The
changes in price and SOV vehicle counts were used to determine the elasticity to price of
paying SOVs. Elasticity for HOVs as well as total elasticity were also calculated.
One month before each field experiment were compared to the same period in 2011.
The pricing plan used during the two periods was the same and also matched the prices
during the baseline period. Elasticity results were calculated using the net change in price
and vehicle counts, subtracting any changes occurring between 2011 and 2012 in the control
period.
Elasticity for SOVs and HOVs follows the same format as Equation 4.3, where demand
is replaced with flow (veh/hour).
HOV and SOV vehicle counts for the MnPASS lanes during the three field experiments
were measured at the respective critical plazas. SOV counts are for individual accounts and
exclude business accounts or those with more than two tranponders tied to one account.
The values are converted to flow (vehicles/hours) and are displayed in Table 4.10. Average
prices can be found in Table 4.7.
Using the change in vehicle flow and the average price change between the two periods,
elasticity values were calculated and are displayed below in Table 4.10.
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Table 4.10: Field Experiment Elasticity of Average Vehicle Flow
Flow in Vehicles/Hour (Q)
Baseline (B) Field (E) ∆ (%) Control ∆ (%) Net ∆ (%) Elasticity
(1) Plaza 1003
Total HOT 1083 1111 2.581 1.211 1.370 0.4086
HOV 665 636 -4.458 -8.391 3.673 1.095
SOV 416 475 14.29 16.62 -2.333 -0.6958
(2)
Plaza 3005
Total HOT 1043 1167 11.96 16.75 -4.791 0.0828
HOV 738 808 9.606 11.09 -1.481 0.0256
SOV 305 359 17.66 32.64 -14.97 0.2587
Plaza 3012
Total HOT 905 1071 18.30 19.33 -1.033 0.0365
HOV 678 789 16.40 16.19 0.2101 -0.0074
SOV 227 281 23.96 25.84 -1.882 0.0664
(3) Plaza 1003
Total HOT 817 821 0.4092 -4.108 4.517 0.1091
HOV 442 412 -6.779 -9.412 2.633 0.0636
SOV 375 409 8.867 4.519 4.348 0.1071
Time of Day: 7:00-9:00
(1) I394: FE: 2012-10-8 to 2012-11-2, Base: 2011-10-10 to 2011-11-4, Control: September 2011 and 2012
(2) I35W: FE: 2012-10-29 to 2012-11-23, Base: 2011-10-31 to 2011-11-25, Control: October 2011 and 2012
(3) I394: FE 2012-12-10 to 2012-12-21 & 2013-1-7 to 2013-1-25, Base: 2011-12-12 to 2011-12-23 & 2012-
1-9 to 2012-1-27, Control: November2011 and 2012
Results of vehicle flow for the three field experiments tend to validate earlier results,
with a few exceptions. Both field experiments on I-394 saw a total net increase in flow.
Previous results showed net increases in density and SMnPASS during these experiments.
The first field experiment saw net increases in total flow and HOV. Although there was a
net decline in SOV flow, there was a large increase seen in both the field experiment and
control period. The observed net price change during the first field experiment was positive.
This is due to an increase in demand as well as the increase in price from the pricing plan
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at higher density levels as explained earlier. With the modified pricing structure, it was
expected that prices would be lower at lower densities and higher at higher densities. This
complexity makes analysis of the first field experiment more difficult to discern.
Results from the I-35W field experiment resulted primarily in net decreases in flow.
This corresponds to a net decrease in price. Changes were greater and more consistent at
plaza 3005, compared to plaza 3012. Plaza 3005 saw net decreases in both SOV and HOV
flow, while plaza 3012 saw a net decrease in SOV flow, but a very small net increase in
HOV flow. Total flow at plaza 3012, however, decreased. Elasticity results are displayed in
Table 4.10.
Results from the third field experiment were the most consistent with net increases in
SOV and HOV flow. These increases corresponded with an increase in price. These led to
the positive elasticity values in Table 4.10.
Chapter 5
Discussion
With the increasing interest in HOT lanes around the US, it is important to understand
drivers’ responses to varying toll prices. Specifically focusing on the MnPASS lanes on I-394
and I-35W in Minneapolis, this thesis found drivers paid between $60 and $124 per hour of
travel time savings. Consistent with other studies, these values suggest drivers are paying
for more than just travel time savings, but other factors such as reliability.
Analysis of driver elasticity using various methods yielded positive demand elasticity
to price. Both SOVs and HOVs increased usage of the MnPASS lanes with higher prices.
Statistically significant elasticities ranged between about +0.03 to +0.85. The increased
demand resulting from higher prices (and decreased demand from lower prices) is likely a
result of driver perception of the posted price. Drivers likely view the price as an indication
of time savings and congestion, suggesting higher prices provide greater time savings. No
travel times or congestion levels are made available to drivers entering MnPASS corridors,
therefore, the MnPASS price may act as a signal of downstream congestion. Drivers must
make a quick decision whether to use the MnPASS lanes and the posted price acts as one
important factor. Other intangibles also influence a user’s lane choice decision. In any
case, drivers are consuming different goods when the toll varies, because time savings is not
constant. These different goods represent different demand curves and not movement along
one downward sloping demand curve Beggs (2010). Therefore, although price is higher,
quantity consumed is also higher.
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Part II
Alternative Pricing Strategies and
Partial Equilibrium Analysis
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Chapter 6
Alternative HOT Lane Pricing
Strategies
6.1 Introduction
HOT lanes charge a toll to single occupancy vehicles (SOVs) for several reasons. The
toll serves to raise revenue to cover operating costs and to regulate the demand of SOVs.
HOT lanes around the country use different methods for determining the toll, however,
all methods raise the toll price during more congested periods. The theory is, a higher
toll price discourages demand and is used to maintain a high level of service (LOS) in
the HOT lane(s). Part I of this thesis showed, however, that a higher price may act as a
signal of downstream congestion, causing demand to increase to a point. This section will
explore current HOT pricing strategies and propose some alternatives. These alternative
strategies will be tested using a partial equilibrium analysis. This analysis uses a calibrated
HOT lane choice model to determine the HOT lane share at various prices and determine
demand elasticity to price.
6.2 Pricing on HOT Lanes
Table 6.1 summarizes the tolling strategies of various HOT lanes around the United States.
Several HOT lane systems base the toll on time of day, while others are dependent on HOT
density or speed. Details of the MnPASS lanes’ pricing system are outlined in the following
section.
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Table 6.1: HOT Lane Tolling Strategies
City Highway System Open Date Length (miles) Toll Dependency
Atlanta20 I-85 2011 16 HOT Density
Denver13 I-25 2006 7 Time
Houston23 I-10 2009 12 Time
Miami19 I-95 2008, 2014 8, 13 (total) HOT Density
Minneapolis29 I-394 2005 11 HOT Density
Orange County1 SR 91 2003 10 Time
San Diego16 I-15 1998 12 Dynamic
Seattle40 SR 167 2008 9 HOT Speed
Washington, D.C. 38 I-495 2012 14 HOT Density
6.3 MnPASS Current Operation
This sections details the toll operation of the MnPASS lanes. Table 6.2 below lists the
hours of operation for the two MnPASS corridors.
Table 6.2: Hours of Operation
Corridor Direction Section Start Time End Time
I-394 EB I-494 to Hwy 100 6:00 10:00
I-394 EB Hwy 100 to Downtown Minneapolis 6:00 13:00
I-394 WB Hwy 100 to I-494 14:00 19:00
I-394 WB Downtown Minneapolis to Hwy 100 14:00 5:00
I-35W NB Crystal Lake Road to Hwy 62 6:00 10:00
I-35W NB Hwy 62 to Downtown Minneapolis 6:00, 15:00 10:00, 19:00
I-35W SB 42nd St to I-494 6:00, 15:00 10:00, 19:00
I-35W SB I-494 to Hwy 13 15:00 19:00
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Prices during operation times range from a minimum of $0.25 to a maximum $8.00.
I-394 and I-35W are each divided into multiple sections with prices posted for use of each
segment. The maximum price applies to use of each section individually, as well as use of
all sections.
Prices are adjusted every three minutes based on density levels measured in the MnPASS
lanes only. Traffic levels in the GP lanes do not influence price. Loop detector counts are
taken every 30 seconds. These counts are used to calculate the density in the MnPASS
lanes at various plazas along the corridor. Each plaza consists of several detectors in series.
Density measurements are averaged over the last 6 minute period in order to smooth out
fluctuations. Drivers are charged based on the maximum density downstream of their
entrance point. Densities upstream do not influence the paid price. Price is dictated by
the magnitude of density as well as the change in density over the previous 6 minutes.
A rise in density creates an increase in price. Table 6.3 displays the pricing plan, which
regulates the price based on density level. Minimums and maximums for a given LOS must
be maintained. Table 6.4 indicates the changes in price caused by a change in density.
Table 6.3: Pricing Plan for Normal Operation of MnPASS Lanes (both I-35W and I-394)
Level of Service Min K Max K Min Rate ($) Default Rate ($) Max Rate ($)
A 0 11 0.25 0.25 0.50
B 12 18 0.50 0.50 1.50
C 19 31 1.50 1.50 2.50
D 32 42 2.50 3.00 3.50
E 43 49 3.50 5.00 5.00
F 50 50 5.00 8.00 8.00
Density in veh/mi/ln; Prices in $
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Table 6.4: Price Changes Based on Change in Density
Density ∆ 1 ∆ 2 ∆ 3 ∆ 4 ∆ 5 ∆ 6
0-18 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25
19+ 0.25 0.50 0.75 1.00 1.25 1.50
Density in veh/mi/ln; Prices in $
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6.4 Alternative Pricing Strategies
The following pricing strategies are proposed alternatives to the current system used on the
MnPASS HOT lanes. The continuous function is similar to the current pricing algorithm
in that it relies strictly on HOT density for determining price, however, instead of relying
on a series of tables, price is determined from a simple mathematical equation. The three
value pricing strategies incorporate GP density and use the difference in density between
the HOT and GP lanes to determine price. Details of the pricing strategies are outlined
below.
In all cases, the prices are confined to several contraints to match the existing pricing
algorithm. The minimum price is $0.25, the maximum $8.00 and all prices are rounded to
the nearest $0.25. The following equation represents the contraints which are applied after
the unconstrained price is determined.
Pconstrained = Rnd(Min(Max(Punconstrained, 0.25), 8.00), 0.25) (6.1)
Punconstrained may be defined several ways, as discussed below.
6.4.1 Continuous Function
Prices using this function are determined by:
Pcontinuous = α ∗KβHOT (6.2)
where P represents the price in USD and K the density in vehicles/mile/lane.
KHOT is found using the same method as the current algorithm (maximum downstream
density averaged over last 6 minutes). α and β are constants which can be adjusted to
achieve the desired curve. The current algorithm implementation relies on a table of values
relating density to price, whereas the continuous function determines the toll based on a
simple mathematical relationship between density and price.
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6.4.2 Unweighted Value Pricing
While the current pricing algorithm only evaluates the density in the HOT lane, this pricing
strategy would compute price based on the difference in density between the GP and HOT
lanes. The difference in density between the lane groups is correlated with a difference
in time savings and therefore, the value provided by the HOT lane. Implementation of
this pricing scheme (and subsequent strategies), will require the integration of GP density
as a factor in determining price. GP density is averaged among parallel detectors. The
maximum downstream GP density is then used to determine price, along with the maximum
downstream HOT density.
PV alueunweighted = γ ∗ [KGP −KHOT ] (6.3)
6.4.3 HOTweighted Value Pricing
Differences in density between GP and HOT lanes do not correlate directly to travel speeds.
Rather, there is a correlation with the magnitude of densities. For example, little speed
difference exists between 10 and 20 vehicles/mi/ln, both likely experience free flow speeds.
However, a greater speed difference exists at higher densities (between 40 and 50 veh/mi/ln).
Therefore, it makes more sense to weight the density difference between the GP and HOT,
based on the magnitude of density. This function weights the difference based on the
magnitude of the HOT lane density. Similarly to the current algorithm, price will increase
proportionally with HOT density.
PV alueHOTweighted = δ ∗ [KGP −KHOT ] ∗KHOT (6.4)
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6.4.4 GPweighted Value Pricing
This pricing strategy is weighted based on GP density instead of HOT density. If KGP is
much greater than KHOT and KHOT is very low, then the HOT weighted value pricing
strategy would yield a low price even though there would be a significant value in using the
HOT lane. By weighting based on KGP , this strategy ties price more directly to the GP
lane congestion and the actual time savings gained by using the HOT lane.
PV alueGPweighted = σ ∗ [KGP −KHOT ] ∗KGP (6.5)
Chapter 7
Partial Equilibrium Analysis
The partial equilibrium analysis involves using a fixed demand of SOVs with predefined
commute times and locations to calibrate a lane choice model and eventually test alternative
pricing strategies. The SOVs are equipped with transponders and can decide whether to use
the MnPASS or GP lanes based on the toll and their expected travel time and reliability.
The following sections outline the process.
7.1 Lane Choice Model
This HOT lane choice model extends work done by Carlos Carrion (Carrion, 2010). The
binomial logit model determines the probability of a vehicle using the HOT lane based
on several independent variables. These variables include estimated travel times and travel
time variability for both the HOT lane and the GP lanes, as well as the posted toll price. The
lane choice model applies only to SOVs equipped with transponders. SOVs not equipped
with transponders are not allowed to use the MnPASS lanes. A separate subscription choice
model was developed to determine which vehicles are equipped with transponders. Details
of this model are outlined in Owen et al. (2013).
7.1.1 Model Coefficients
Utility from Carrion (2010) is described as:
U = f(T, V, P,A)
where
T: Expected Travel Time The utility decreases with an increase in expected travel
time, decreasing the probability of using the given lane type. Expected travel time is
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measured in minutes.
V: Travel Time Variability Travel time variability in this model is defined as the 90th
percentile - 50th percentile to correspond with Carrion (2010). This value is calculated
separately for the HOT lane and GP lanes. Like expected travel time, an increase in
variability decreases the probability of using that lane. Travel time variability is measured
in minutes.
P: Expected Toll Price The expected toll variable is based on the dynamic message
sign posted price. The price corresponds to a user’s entry and exit points. This model
assumes all drivers will exit in downtown Minneapolis. Therefore, the expected toll will
vary only by entry point. Toll prices are in USD. The negative sign indicates a dissuasion
from higher tolls, assuming all other factors remain constant.
A: Alternative Specific Constant In this model, the ASC was defaulted to zero and
adjusted if necessary in the calibration.
7.2 Calibration of Lane Choice Model
While the model was previously calibrated in (Carrion, 2010), the calibration relied on
a very small sample size of vehicles and was therefore, recalibrated using the following
methodology.
The lane choice model is calibrated by matching a set of simulated vehicles’ HOT lane
decisions to match historical data. The list of vehicles was generated from trip tables pro-
vided by the Metropolitan Council. All vehicles are SOVs traveling eastbound to downtown
Minneapolis on I-394 between 6:00-10:00 AM. Each vehicle has an entrance ramp and time
of entry into the system. The subscription choice model from Owen et al. (2013) is first
applied to filter non-transponder owning SOVs. Each vehicle experiences various travel
times based on the entrance ramp and time of entry. These travel times are the basis of
the expected travel time and travel time reliability parameters of the lane choice model.
Details of the calibration steps are outlined in the following sections.
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The lane choice model coefficients are adjusted using a grid search technique. Default
values for the coefficients were taken from Carrion (2010), with the exception of the alter-
native specific constant (ASC) which was set to zero. The grid search approach involves
adjusting each of the coefficients separately, while keeping all others constant. The first
coefficient is altered until the model achieves its best fit to the calibration target. This
coefficient is then kept constant and the second coefficient is adjusted and so on until the
fit can no longer be improved.
In this model, the ratio of expected travel time to travel time variability was kept
constant and the ASC was defaulted to zero. The travel time coefficients were adjusted
first, followed by the toll coefficient and ASC (if necessary). The ratio of expected travel
time to travel time variability was kept constant due to the extensive literature research
outlined in from Carrion and Levinson (2012b) in determining this value.
7.2.1 Travel History
Each vehicle builds a travel time history by experiencing MnPASS travel times along the
corridor based on their entrance ramp and time of entry. All travel is along I-394 Eastbound
to downtown Minneapolis. The travel times are calculated using loop detector data from
each Wednesday of 2012 (except July 4 and December 26). This travel history determines
a vehicles expected travel time (mean of travel history) and travel time variability (90th
percentile minus 50th percentile.
7.2.2 Calibration Target
In order to calibrate the lane choice model, it is necessary to determine the probability that
a transponder owning SOV will use the MnPASS lane.
Using Bayes’ theorem:
Pr(L|R) = Pr(R|L) ∗ Pr(L)/Pr(R) (7.1)
Pr(R) is the probability of radio transponder ownership (from subscription choice
model). Pr(L) represents the probability of using the HOT lane among all SOVs. Pr(R|L)
61
is the probability of owning a transponder given use of the HOT lane. Since only SOVs are
being considered, Pr(R|L) is 1 (or 100%) assuming no illegal use of the HOT lane.
Pr(L) was calculated by finding the number of SOVs using the MnPASS lane and di-
viding by total number of vehicles using the corridor during the same time period. Total
vehicle counts were gathered from loop detector data. The number of HOVs using the GP
lanes is assumed to be zero. Counts of SOVs using the MnPASS lane come from transpon-
der data which shows entry and exit plazas and entry time, along with paid toll price. By
comparing the counts throughout morning peak period with the GP loop detector data,
Pr(L) can be determined.
Pr(R) was calculated by correlating the subscription choice model in Owen et al. (2013)
with subscription data for each transportation analysis zone (TAZ) along the corridor. Each
vehicle’s entrance ramp can be probabilistically correlated to surrounding TAZs. By then
applying the subscription choice model to the total set of SOVs, a subset of transponder
equipped SOVs is formed.
7.2.3 Calibration Day
In previous research conducted by the Minnesota Traffic Observatory (MTO), trip gener-
ation models and traffic simulations were calibrated to November 29, 2011. This day was
selected because it was an average day with no weather or crash related problems along
the MnPASS corridors. Due to the connection of this research to the calibrated simulation
used in the MTO, this calendar day was selected for calibration of the lane choice model.
The Pr(L) value from 11/29/2011 and Pr(R), result in:
Pr(L|R) = (100%) ∗ (11.8%)/(17.3%) = 68.1% (7.2)
7.2.4 Price-Time Savings and Price-Reliability Models
Although the MnPASS toll price fluctuates based on HOT density, there is a direct corre-
lation between the toll and the time savings the MnPASS lanes provide over the GP lanes.
The higher the toll, the greater the time savings. This correlation is observed by users and
explains the positive demand elasticity to price results in Part I of this thesis.
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Using average toll prices and time savings data from 2012, a log relationship was fit.
The bimodal relationship of the data meant two log functions were fit, one for congestion
onset and one for the offset.
The relationship between price and time savings during congestion onset is represented
by ∆Tonset = 1.2587ln(P ) + 0.5527 with an r
2 value of 0.892. The relationship during
congestion offset is represented by∆Toffset = 0.7953ln(P ) + 1.2965 with an r
2 value of
0.913. The congestion onset and offset data are significantly different at the α=0.001 level.
The curves are displayed in Figure 7.1.
The increased travel time reliability of the MnPASS lanes is also proportional to the
toll price. Again, two log functions were fit to the congestion onset and offset data.
The relationship between price and difference in time savings variance during congestion
onset is represented by ∆Vonset = 1.1413ln(P ) + 0.9566 with an r
2 value of 0.942. The
relationship between during congestion offset is represented by ∆Voffset = 0.926ln(P ) +
1.6636 with an r2 value of 0.9657. The congestion onset and offset data are significantly
different at the α=0.001 level.
Table 7.1: Price-Time Savings and Price-Reliability Regression Results
Time Savings vs Price Time Variance Difference vs Price
Variable Onset Offset Onset Offset
Intercept 0.5527(0.05972)*** 1.2965(0.02912)*** 0.9566(0.03867)*** 1.6636(0.01664)***
log(P ) 1.2587(0.07732)*** 0.7953(0.03743)*** 1.1413(0.05006)*** 0.926(0.02139)***
n 40 40 40 40
r2 0.8923 0.913 0.942 0.9657
(Standard error in parentheses)
Significance * 0.05, ** 0.01, *** 0.001
Time Savings and Time Variance Difference in minutes are the dependent variables, price in USD is the
independent variable
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Figure 7.1: Price-Time Savings Log Model
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∆Tonset = 1.2587ln(P ) + 0.5527 (r
2=0.8923)
∆Toffset = 0.7953ln(P ) + 1.2965 (r
2 = 0.913)
where ∆T is travel time savings in minutes and P is price in USD
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Figure 7.2: Price-Reliability Model
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∆Vonset = 1.1413ln(P ) + 0.9566 (r
2 = 0.942)
∆Voffset = 0.926ln(P ) + 1.6636 (r
2 = 0.9657)
where ∆V is time variance difference in minutes and P is price in USD
65
7.2.5 Calibration Process
The following flowchart displays the process of calibrating the lane choice model. The model
coefficients are altered following a grid search technique until the resulting HOT lane share
percentage matches the calibration target of 68.1%.
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7.2.6 Resulting Coefficients
The lane choice parameters were for both congestion onset and offset. The resulting values
are found in Table 7.2 below.
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Table 7.2: Lane Choice Model Parameters for Calibration
Parameter Carrion(2010) Onset Offset
Expected Travel Time -0.672 -7.27 -10.7
Travel Time Variability -0.228 -2.47 -3.63
HOT Lane Toll -6.94 -6.94 -6.94
Alternative Specific Constant -2.23 0 0
7.3 Testing of the Alternative Pricing Strategies
The calibrated HOT lane choice model was used to test the behavior of the alternative pric-
ing strategies and how changing prices affect HOTshare, which is the share of transponder
owning SOVs which use the MnPASS lane.
HOTshare =
# of transponder owning SOVs using the MnPASS lane(s)
Total # of transponder SOVs using the corridor (all lanes)
= Pr(L|R)
(7.3)
Each pricing strategies’ coefficients were incrementally adjusted and the process rerun
to determine the resulting HOTshare. The average price and HOTshare were recorded for
each iteration. The results were graphed and fit for each pricing strategy (congestion onset
and offset). Table 7.3 displays the regression results from fitting one pricing strategy using
a first, second, third and fourth order polynomial function. The fourth degree polynomial
functions for each scenario are displayed in 7.4 and the figures below. The first four figures
represent congestion onset, the latter four congestion offset.
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Table 7.3: Continuous Pricing Function Onset Regression Results
Variable Model 1 (1st order) Model 2 (2nd order) Model 3 (3rd order) Model 4 (4th order)
Intercept 21.46(5.321)*** -0.9280(3.140) -15.297(1.997)*** -25.884(0.9949)***
P 1.017(1.291) 35.019(2.892)*** 71.931(3.546)*** 108.91(2.670)***
P 2 - -4.5576(0.3788)*** -17.218(1.129)*** -40.396(1.516)***
P 3 - - 1.0781(0.09485)*** 5.7446(0.2956)***
P 4 - - - -0.2941(0.01849)***
n 44 44 44 44
r2 0.0146 0.7825 0.9486 0.9931
(Standard error in parentheses)
Significance * 0.05, ** 0.01, *** 0.001
HOTshare is dependent variable, P is price in USD
Table 7.4: Pricing Function Model Equations
Pricing Function Model r2
Onset
Continuous HOTshare = −0.2941P 4 + 5.7446P 3 − 40.396P 2 + 108.91P − 25.884 0.9931
Unweighted HOTshare = −0.1555P 4 + 3.6124P 3 − 31.812P 2 + 106.14P − 26.573 0.9909
HOTweighted HOTshare = −0.3468P 4 + 6.3111P 3 − 40.349P 2 + 98.579P − 22.116 0.9493
GPweighted HOTshare = −0.1785P 4 + 3.2471P 3 − 22.649P 2 + 66.301P − 13.515 0.9604
Offset
Continuous HOTshare = −0.2394P 4 + 4.4049P 3 − 27.423P 2 + 51.688P + 61.127 0.9904
UnweightedV alue HOTshare = −0.1284P 4 + 3.0066P 3 − 23.308P 2 + 51.99P + 61.762 0.9887
HOTweighted HOTshare = −0.1652P 4 + 2.9438P 3 − 17.877P 2 + 29.923P + 69.3 0.9801
GPweighted HOTshare = −0.0546P 4 + 1.2879P 3 − 10.691P 2 + 22.483P + 68.142 0.9905
P is price in USD
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Figure 7.3: Continuous Pricing Function - Onset
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HOTshare = −0.2941P 4 + 5.7446P 3 − 40.396P 2 + 108.91P − 25.884
r2 = 0.9931
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Figure 7.4: Unweighted Value Pricing - Onset
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HOTshare = −0.1555P 4 + 3.6124P 3 − 31.812P 2 + 106.14P − 26.573
r2 = 0.9909
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Figure 7.5: HOTweighted Value Pricing - Onset
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HOTshare = −0.3468P 4 + 6.3111P 3 − 40.349P 2 + 98.579P − 22.116
r2 = 0.9493
72
Figure 7.6: GPweighted Value Pricing - Onset
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HOTshare = −0.1785P 4 + 3.2471P 3 − 22.649P 2 + 66.301P − 13.515
r2 = 0.9604
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Figure 7.7: Continuous Pricing Function - Offset
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HOTshare = −0.2394P 4 + 4.4049P 3 − 27.423P 2 + 51.688P + 61.127
r2 = 0.9904
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Figure 7.8: Unweighted Value Pricing - Offset
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HOTshare = −0.1284P 4 + 3.0066P 3 − 23.308P 2 + 51.99P + 61.762
r2 = 0.9887
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Figure 7.9: HOTweighted Value Pricing - Offset
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HOTshare = −0.1652P 4 + 2.9438P 3 − 17.877P 2 + 29.923P + 69.3
r2 = 0.9801
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Figure 7.10: GPweighted Value Pricing - Offset
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HOTshare = −0.0546P 4 + 1.2879P 3 − 10.691P 2 + 22.483P + 68.142
r2 = 0.9905
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7.3.1 Elasticity
The functions above describe HOTshare as a function of toll price. The elasticity of
HOTshare to price is determined by taking the derivative of the function and multiply-
ing by the quotient of price divided by HOTshare.
εHOTshare(P ) =
P ∗HOT ′share(P )
HOTshare(P )
=
dlnHOTshare(P )
dlnP
(7.4)
7.11 and 7.12 are graphs of elasticity as a function of price for the continuous function
pricing strategy (onset and offset). The elasticity equations are displayed below each figure.
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Figure 7.11: Continuous Pricing Function - Onset
-5
-4
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8El
as
ti
ci
ty
 
Price ($) 
εHOTshare(P ) =
P∗(−1.176∗4∗P3+17.23∗P2−80.79∗P+108.9)
HOTshare(P )
where p is price in USD
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Figure 7.12: Continuous Pricing Function - Offset
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εHOTshare(P ) =
P∗(−0.9576∗P3+13.21∗P2−54.85∗P+51.69)
HOTshare(P )
where p is price in USD
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7.4 Discussion
All four pricing strategies show a similar pattern in the relationship between HOTshare
and price. The maximum HOTshare during congestion onset is achieved between $2 and
$3, whereas during congestion offset, the greatest HOTshare occurs between $1 and $2. In
general, the HOTshare during congestion offset is greater than during the onset due to the
greater time savings and reliability per dollar toll price as demonstrated previously in 7.1
and 7.2.
The unweighted value pricing strategy achieves the highest maximum HOTshare of
all pricing strategies, but the share rises and drops more quickly than the weighted value
pricing strategies (HOTweighted and GPweighted) . Table 7.5 shows the average price and
HOTshare for each pricing strategy along with the standard deviation.
Table 7.5: Average HOTshare and Prices
Pricing Strategy Avg Price ($) Std Dev Price ($) Avg HOTshare (%) Std Dev HOTshare (%)
Onset Offset Onset Offset
Continuous 2.93 2.93 54.6 24.4 31.6 24.7
Unweighted 3.19 3.20 54.1 24.5 36.9 32.6
HOT Weighted 3.65 2.93 49.4 24.5 31.6 19.3
GP Weighted 3.83 3.26 45.5 18.9 34.0 21.0
Figures 7.3 - 7.10 show the rise and fall of the HOTshare as the toll increases (and
therefore, time savings). The following chart outlines how changes in toll and time savings
affect HOTshare and ultimately, elasticity to price.
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Increase in Toll
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Change in HOT
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At lower tolls, an increase in price results in a higher HOTshare (positive elasticity),
whereas at higher tolls, an increase in price causes a decrease in HOTshare (negative elastic-
ity). At lower tolls, the improved time savings and reliability outweigh the increase in toll.
However, at higher tolls, the increase in toll outweighs greater time savings and reliability
causing the HOTshare to decrease.
7.5 Conclusion
Part II of this thesis outlined four HOT lane pricing strategies which could serve as al-
ternatives to the current MnPASS pricing system. The current system relies on a series
of density and price tables to determine the toll based strictly on HOT lane density. The
proposed alternatives determine the toll based on a simple mathematical function relating
HOT lane density (and GP density in three of the strategies) to price. The three value
pricing strategies use the difference in GP and HOT lane density to determine the toll. Due
to the nonlinear relationship between density and time savings, two of the strategies are
weighted by either HOT density or GP density. The HOTweighted strategy combines the
value pricing concept with the current algorithm’s direct correlation between HOT density
and price. For this reason, this pricing strategy would provide the greatest improvement
over the current pricing system while still maintaining some of the same logic. The contin-
uous function, on the other hand, most closely resembles the current pricing system, but
fails to account for the density in the GP lanes.
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The behavior of the four alternative pricing strategies was tested using a fixed demand
partial equilibrium analysis. Using a calibrated lane choice model, simulated vehicles made
decisions on whether to use the MnPASS lane based on the toll and their anticipated time
savings and improved travel time reliability. The HOTshare was determined at various
price increments for each pricing system. These were plotted and fit with a fourth degree
polynomial, the derivatives of which correlate to the elasticity to price. In all cases, demand
elasticity to price was positive at lower tolls and negative at higher tolls. MnPASS users
recognize the correlation between the toll price and the time savings and travel time relia-
bility provided by the lanes. The toll price acts as a proxy of downstream congestion. At
lower tolls, the travel time savings and reliability advantage outweighs the cost of the toll
and HOTshare rises. However, at higher tolls, the cost of using the lane begins to outweigh
the benefit and the HOTshare drops.
Chapter 8
Conclusion
With the increasing interest in HOT lanes around the US, it is important to understand
drivers responses to varying toll prices. Specifically focusing on the MnPASS lanes on I-394
and I-35W in Minneapolis, this thesis found drivers paid between $60 and $124 per hour of
travel time savings. Consistent with other studies, these values suggest drivers are paying
for more than just travel time savings, but other factors such as reliability.
Analysis of driver elasticity using various methods yielded positive demand elasticity
to price. Both SOVs and HOVs increased usage of the MnPASS lanes with higher prices.
Statistically significant elasticities ranged between about +0.03 to +0.85. The increased
demand resulting from higher prices (and decreased demand from lower prices) is likely a
result of driver perception of the posted price. Drivers likely view the price as an indication
of time savings and congestion, suggesting higher prices provide greater time savings. No
travel times or congestion levels are made available to drivers entering MnPASS corridors,
therefore, the MnPASS price may act as a signal of downstream congestion. Drivers must
make a quick decision whether to use the MnPASS lanes and the posted price acts as one
important factor. Other intangibles also influence a user’s lane choice decision. In any
case, drivers are consuming different goods when the toll varies, because time savings is not
constant. These different goods represent different demand curves and not movement along
one downward sloping demand curve (Beggs, 2010). Therefore, although price is higher,
quantity consumed is also higher.
Alternative pricing strategies were proposed which allow for determining tolls through
simple mathematical functions instead of pricing tables. Three of the strategies incorporate
the density of the GP lanes. These strategies more closely tie the toll price to the time sav-
ings benefit provided by the MnPASS lanes by looking at the difference in density between
the HOT and GP lanes.
The partial equilibrium analysis used fixed demand data to calibrate a HOT lane choice
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model developed by (Carrion, 2010). The lane choice model was used to test the four alter-
native pricing strategies and see how HOTshare levels change with price. The correlation
between toll price and time savings causes the HOTshare to rise as price is increased at
lower toll values. However, at higher toll prices, the travel time benefits are outweighed by
the increase in price causing the HOTshare to decrease. This behavior causes both posi-
tive and negative elasticity values. The positive elasticity results from Part I are likely the
result of the average toll price being less than the“critical price” at which elasticity turn
negative and HOTshare decreases. Therefore, an increase in the average toll caused an
increase in demand and vice versa. As HOT lane engineers incorporate pricing strategies,
it is important to understand this behavior and ensure that the average HOT density at
the “critical price” is less than or equal to the maximum desired HOT density.
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